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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Petitioners

object

to

Respondents'

"Statement

Presented on Appeal and Standard of Appellate Review."
assert

for

the

first

time

that

Petitioners'

of

Issues

Respondents
claim

of

ineffectiveness for counsel's failure to pursue a direct appeal is
"moot."

This issue was not raised in the trial Court and should

not be considered on appeal.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioners

in this particular

case

assert

they did

not

receive the representation to which they were entitled by the Sixth
Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution.

(R270).

The

benchmark for judging the claims of ineffectiveness is whether
counsel's

conduct

undermined

adversarial process.

the

proper

functioning

of

the

See e.g.. State v. Tennyson, 850 P. 2d 461

(Utah App. 1993).
The record shows that the most fundamental procedures of the
adversarial criminal process were not employed by Petitioners'
counsel.

The court records in Petitioners' criminal cases indicate

their counsel did not file formal discovery despite Petitioners'
requests.
with

The limited discovery counsel did have was not shared

Petitioners.

Petitioners

were

never

advised,

until

the

discovery in this proceeding, that the key testimony against them
would come from confidential informants.
In addition, Petitioners have testified that their attorneys
erroneously told them that they must plead guilty and that if they
1

did they would serve only five years in prison.

These statements

came

intimidated

in

coerced.

a meeting

in which

Petitioners

were

and

Finally, Petitioners claim their counsel were ineffective

because they failed to keep their promises to assist Petitioners
before the Board of Pardons and to assist them in motions to
withdraw their pleas and in their appeals.
Petitioners

have

further

testified

that

but

for

their

counsel's errors, they would have insisted upon a trial of the
charges

made

against

them

and

they

would

effectiveness claims on direct appeal.
directly

asserted

the

prejudice

have

raised

their

Thus, Petitioners have

required

by

Strickland

v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Respondents, in their brief, request the Court to affirm the
finding that Petitioners have not shown prejudice and request the
Court, for the first time, to refrain from considering the issues
of ineffectiveness relating to Petitioners' appeal because it is
"moot."
Petitioners respectfully assert that the trial court, and
Respondents, have had to make unsupported assumptions that are not
justified by the record to conclude Petitioners have not shown
prejudice.

Petitioners further assert that Respondents' argument

that Petitioners' claims are "moot" is untimely and without merit.
Petitioners will address each one of Respondents' arguments in
the order in which they are made.
court's

ruling

is

that

Because the crux of the trial

Petitioners

did

not

show

particular effort will be made to show that they have.
2

prejudice,

ARGUMENT
I.
The Standard of Review Allows a Reversal of the Trial Court
Respondents properly set forth that Petitioners' claims of
ineffective counsel present mixed questions of law and fact and
that the trial court's legal conclusions must be reviewed de novo.
(Respondents' Brief at 2 ) .
legal

conclusion

that

When they address the trial court's

Petitioners

did

not

show

Respondents argue the trial court made a factual
Petitioners' testimony was not credible.

prejudice,

finding that

(.Id. at 14).

There is not a finding that addresses the credibility of
Petitioners.

(Appellants'

Brief,

Addendum

linchpin of Respondents' argument is missing.

"B") .

Thus,

the

Since there is no

such finding, the Court should remand for further fact finding, or
reapply the facts, and permit Petitioners to withdraw their pleas.
See e.g., Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure,
§32.3, p. 511 (1988).
II.
Respondents Omit Many Key Facts
in Their Statement of Facts
Respondents' Statement of Facts is one sided.

Respondents

primarily rely on a deposition of Mr. Dean Hickman's counsel that
is shallow and obviously biased.

(Respondents' Brief, Addendum F) .

Even the trial court's sparse factual findings do not conform to
this deposition.
Petitioners assert the most credible testimony, together with
exhibits, shows that their counsel's representation fell below an
3

objective standard of reasonableness.

Counsel did not take the

steps necessary for the adversarial process to work.

Significantly

important is the fact, accepted by the trial court, that counsel
did not show their clients the limited information that they had so
that Petitioners could intelligently and knowingly determine to go
to trial.

Petitioners both testified that had they known of the

evidence against them, they would have insisted upon a trial.
A.

Discovery

Petitioners claim that their counsel did not make a discovery
demand, did not obtain the necessary discovery and did not share
the discovery in their possession with Petitioners.
R246).
the

(R5; R220;

This means counsel failed to disclose to Petitioners that

State's

treatment

key witnesses were

informants

receiving

from prosecutors for their testimony.

favorable

(id.).

Both

Petitioners testified that the first time they learned of this was
during the discovery phase on their petition for post conviction
relief and that had they known it at the crucial plea bargain stage
they would not have entered their pleas.

(R231; R255). x

The evidence in the record supports Petitioners.

The court

files in Petitioners' criminal cases did not contain discovery
demands.

(R202) .

This was very unusual.

indicated

it could not

remember

1

Even the trial court

a file where

court

appointed

The State argues that Petitioners have not demonstrated the
discovery would have disclosed exculpatory information.
It was
certainly exculpatory information that the State's case was based
upon confidential informants who had made a deal with the
prosecution.
4

counsel

did not make

a formal request.

(Petitioners' Brief,

Addendum "A" at 2) .2
Petitioners

testified

engage in discovery.

that

they asked

(R191; R219).

their

attorneys

to

Petitioner Dean Hickman also

testified that his requests were met with the response that "it was
not necessary" (R217) . The trial court found counsel did not share
the limited discovery

in their possession with Petitioners or

discuss it with any specificity.

(Petitioners' Brief, Addendum "A"

at 3) .
Respondents do not even mention these findings in their brief.
Instead, they rely upon a statement made by Dean Hickman's counsel
that she received "all" discovery and felt "no necessity" to file
for additional discovery materials.

(Respondents' Brief at 6) .

The statement is lightly made in the deposition attached to the
Respondents' Brief as Addendum F.
In making her statement, Mr. Hickman's criminal case counsel
fails to acknowledge that the practice was to make a discovery
demand with an appearance of counsel. The failure to do so was not
strategy.

Counsel also fails to acknowledge there were threatened

but never filed charges for which there had been no discovery.
Virtually every witness acknowledges that these threatened charges
were a reason for Petitioners' plea of guilty, and Petitioners
testified they did not have information about them.
2

(R200; R217;

The court's observation that it had not seen a case
involving court appointed counsel where a discovery demand had not
been made emphasizes the fact that the failure to make a demand in
this case was not a matter of "strategy."
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
5

R243).

It

is

well

established

investigate underlying

that

counsel's

facts is not reasonable

failure

to

representation.

State v. Tvler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1993).
Furthermore, Respondents do not mention that the only expert
testimony in the record in this case indicated that a failure to
file a discovery demand, a failure to provide the discovery to the
client and a failure to discuss it with the client would not be
reasonable representation (R180-185).
B.

Plea Negotiations

Respondents also ignore crucial facts and rely on selected
testimony when they address Petitioners' claims that

the plea

negotiations were so coercive that there could not be a voluntary,
intelligent waiver of Petitioners' right to trial.
To

argue

that

Petitioners'

counsel

were

not

coercive,

Respondents principally cite very limited testimony from Mr. Dean
Hickman's attorney that "there was the potential for other charges
out there" and that she only "advised" Petitioner Dean Hickman that
"it was in his best interest" to plead guilty to one count of
aggravated robbery "without a firearm enhancement."

(Respondents'

Brief at 7 ) .
Respondents do not mention that Mr. Hickman's attorney did not
conduct any discovery on these other charges.

The record also

indicates she did not make certain that the gun enhancement did not
become part of the sentence.

Nearly three years after the plea,

Mr. Hickman's counsel wrote to him to advise that there had been

6

such an enhancement.

(R225-227; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, attached as

Addendum "A" hereto).
This is crucial when considering Respondents' argument that
Petitioners were not coerced or intimidated because counsel told
Mr. Dean Hickman that he would serve from five years to life.
(Depo. at 5-6, 9 ) .

The gun enhancement itself would require Mr.

Dean Hickman to serve more than five years.
Respondents

do

not

persuasively

contradict

Petitioners'

testimony that they plead guilty, in part, when counsel said that
they would assist in parole hearings.
confirmed by Dean Hickman's counsel.
F at 9) .

(R218).

This promise was

(Respondents' Brief, Addendum

Mr. Dean Hickman further testified that he told his

counsel in advance about the parole hearing.

She then told him

that she did not have to appear once he entered his plea.

(R227).

In fact, counsel never appeared with Petitioners either to withdraw
their pleas, to address the parole board or to file an appeal.
(R227).
Respondents also fail to address Petitioners' claim that their
counsel were ineffective just before their pleas were taken in the
district court because they did not communicate with them.
without

dispute

that

counsel

did not

communicate

at all

It is
with

Petitioners between the time of their circuit court appearance and
their appearance in the district court.

7

(R223-224; R247-248).

After

that

coaching.3

Petitioners

hastily

plead

guilty

with

counsels'

(R224-226; R247-251).
C.

Detective Don Bell

In their Brief, Respondents next try to suggest that Detective
Don Bell was not present during the attorney/client meeting which
occurred

just

before

Petitioners

(Respondents' Brief at 8) .
Detective

entered

their

pleas.

The testimony is quite clear that

Bell was present during part of the

attorney/client

meeting.
Mr. Rick Hickman's counsel verified this by his testimony but
could

not

recall whether Detective Bell was present

confidential information was discussed.

(R201).

at

times

Petitioner Rick

Hickman, however, was quite clear when he testified that Detective
Bell was present at times when confidential matters were discussed.
(R241).

The trial court specifically found that Detective Bell was

present during the attorney/client meeting.

(Appellants' Brief,

Addendum " A " ) .
Rather

than acknowledge

that Detective

Bell

was present,

Respondents suggest in footnote 3 at page 9 of their Brief that
Detective Bell may have attended the meeting but that he was not
present

during

the

time

confidential

3

communications

occurred.

Respondents argue that the plea transcripts do not indicate
coaching or statements by counsel. The absence of statements is
not surprising when the transcripts are reviewed.
The reporter
recorded statements between the court and counsel. Communications
between Petitioners and their attorneys were not recorded. It is
unlikely that counsel did not say anything to their clients during
the pleas.
It is far more likely that what they said was not
recorded.
8

(Respondents' Brief at
assumption.

9) .

The record does not

support

this

The best that Respondents can cite is the deposition

testimony in which Dean Hickman's counsel first stated that it was
not true that Mr. Bell was present but went on to say she had
"insufficient information" about the matter "to be able to answer
anything

more

specifically

about

it."

(Respondents'

Brief,

Addendum F at 6 ) .
I")i reel" Appeal
Respondents rely on Dean Hickman's attorney's statement that
he did not ask her to pursue a direct appeal on his behalf and on
Rick Hickman's attorney's statements that he could not recall if he
was asked to appeal.

Petitioners testified they did contact their

attorneys for this purpose and did request an appeal.
R251) .

The

trial

court

did

not

resolve

Petitioners' testimony is more credible.
Petitioners'

this

(R228;

dispute,

but

It is consistent with

filing motions to withdraw their pleas and their

pursuit of this petition.

All criminal defendants, including the

indigent, have a constitutional right to a timely appeal. State v.
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981).

Petitioners Did Not Receive Appellate Review of Their
Effective Assistance of Counsel Claims and the
Trial Court Erroneously Refused to Address Them
Respondents argue that Petitioners' claim to ineffectiveness
of counsel concerning the failure to pursue a direct appeal is
"moot" because Petitioners received appellate review of the denial
of their motions to withdraw their guilty pleas.
9

(Respondents'

Brief at ll). 4 This argument was not raised in the trial court.
It should be rejected as untimely.
As noted in Petitioners' opening Brief, an appeal was taken
from

the

district

court's

withdraw their pleas.

denial

of

Petitioners'

motions

to

State v. Hickman, 779 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1989) .

The appeal primarily examined the factual basis for the pleas
because no property was taken by Petitioners.

Id. at 671.

The Utah Supreme Court also examined the claim of Dean Hickman
that the trial court failed to ask him, before accepting his plea,
whether his plea of guilty was entered free from threats, promises,
and inducements.

The Supreme Court held that it did not matter

since Mr. Dean Hickman had signed a plea affidavit and responded to
other questions from the Court.
The

Supreme

Court's

Id. at 672.

opinion

does

not

address

presented by the petition for post conviction relief.

the

issues

Nothing in

the opinion suggests that the Supreme Court even considered claims
of ineffectiveness of counsel.
Moreover, Respondents erroneously argue for the first time
that Petitioners' claim that counsel should have assisted them in
taking an appeal is "moot" because Petitioners are now receiving
"appellate review of their ineffectiveness allegations."
argument ignores the

This

trial court's oral statements in this case

4

The two cases cited by the Respondents are not on point.
In Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981) and Spain v. Stewart,
63 9 P. 2d 166 (Utah 1981) the Court found petitions for writs of
habeas corpus to be moot because the confinement about which the
petitioners complained had been resolved. In this case the
Petitioners, who are still affected by their counsel's conduct,
strongly desire to withdraw their pleas and go to trial.
10

that it would not consider many of Petitioners' claims because they
should have been raised on direct appeal. Thus, there has not been
a finding or legal conclusion on these claims for this Court to
"review."
As noted in Petitioners' opening Brief, the trial court's
decision to not examine the claims was erroneous.

(Appellants'

Brief, pg. 20-22) . It is well established that Petitioners' claims
may be

considered

conviction relief.

for the

first time on a petition

for post

Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315 (Utah 1992);

Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989); Hurst v. Cook,
777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989).

This is particularly true in a

case like this because it was counsel's lack of effectiveness that
caused the issues to not be heard.

Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P. 2d

547, 549 (Utah 1989).
TV
The District Court Erroneously Determined that
Petitioners Failed to Demonstrate Prejudice
There

is no

demonstrate that:

dispute

in this

case

that

Petitioners

must

1) specific acts or omissions fall outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance; and 2) counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding.
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984)).

The main dispute in this case for the purposes of this appeal
is whether the trial court properly concluded that Petitioners
failed to prove that they would have insisted on going to trial but
for their counsel's ineffectiveness.
11

Both Petitioners testified

they would have insisted upon a trial had their counsel acted
reasonably.
Respondents claim that the trial court has the responsibility
of ascertaining the credibility of witnesses and "apparently did
not find the Petitioners testimony credible." Respondents Brief at
14 (citing Sprouse v. Jecrer, 806 P.2d 219, 222

(Utah App. 1991)

(giving great deference to a trial court's findings in a civil case
where there was conflicting testimony).
There is nothing in the trial court's findings of fact or
conclusions

of

law

to

suggest

the

credibility of Petitioners' testimony.

trial

court

weighed

the

The trial court's findings

do not reveal, one way or the other, that it believed or did not
believe Petitioners.
The only thing in all of the comments of the trial court that
would suggest a basis for his conclusion that prejudice was not
shown was an oral comment that there were other proceedings and
threats of other proceedings.

(Appellants' Brief, Addendum A ) .

Respondents make similar comments in their brief when they assert
Petitioners would not have gone to trial because of other charges.
The

trial

Court

did not

and Respondents

do not point

to

any

testimony where Petitioners indicate they would not have insisted
upon a trial.

The trial court's conclusion that prejudice was not

shown was impermissible speculation because Petitioners' testimony
is just opposite.
This case is like Garmon v. Lockhart, 938 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.
1991) .

In Garmon, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals found that a
12

criminal defendant met both prongs of Strickland where his counsel
gave him erroneous information on which he based his decision to
plead guilty.

The court affirmed the lower court's holding that

the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel when
his attorney incorrectly informed him that he would have to serve
only one-sixth of his plea bargain sentence.
The State in Garmon, like Respondents in this case, tried to
argue that the threat of a longer prison term than provided for in
the plea was the incentive for the plea.

The defendant testified

he would have gone to trial and risked a longer prison term had he
received proper advice from his counsel about the length of time he
would have to serve.
Petitioners in this case are just like the petitioner in
Garmon.

They have specifically indicated they would have risked a

trial had they known of the true nature of the evidence against
them and had they known that they would not be released at the end
of five years.
Finally, Respondents note in their Brief that Petitioners did
not testify that they would have insisted upon a trial absent
counsel

allowing

discussions.

Detective

Bell

to

attend

confidential

plea

Although there is no direct testimony, it is part of

the overall claims that Petitioners make.

As stated by the United

States Supreme Court in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747
(1970) , the reviewing court must take into account all of the
relevant circumstances surrounding the plea bargain.

13

Relevant circumstances in this case include the fact that the
plea

was

a

product

of

a

meeting

held

preliminary hearing on another case.
Bell

threatened

other

charges.

contemporaneous

to

a

In the meeting Detective Don
Rather

than

investigate

the

threatened charges, Petitioners' counsel told them that they had to
plead guilty.

Without being informed of the evidence against them

for any of the crimes with which they were charged or with which
prosecution was threatened, and being assured that they would spend
no more than five years in prison and would be accompanied by their
counsel to the parole board hearings, Petitioners plead guilty.
V.
The District Court Erred in Not Determining
Whether Counsel's Performance Was Deficient
As its last argument, Respondents suggest the district court
was not required to determine whether counsel's performance was
deficient.
trial

court

(Appellees' Brief at 16).
indicate

that

it

felt,

The oral rulings of the
in

some

instances,

that

counsel's performance was deficient:
"The Court does feel that it's clear from the record
that the physical discovery materials that
[Dean
Hickman's] counsel had were not shared. It's clear to
the Court that, other than in a conclusory way, she
didn't discuss those apparently with great specificity."
Thus, as a matter of accuracy, the trial court did indicate that
Petitioners had shown errors by their counsel in some instances.
However, as set forth at pages 9-10, supra, the district court
erroneously failed to determine whether counsel's performance, as
it related to Petitioners' claims of intimidation and coercion, was
unreasonable.
14

The

district

court

compounded

its

error

when

it

Petitioners would not have insisted on going to trial.

found

There is

insufficient factual or legal support for its conclusion.

The

Court should reverse the trial court because Petitioners have shown
they would have insisted upon a trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.

52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and the arguments set forth in their
opening brief, Petitioners respectfully request the Court reverse
the district court's denial of the petition for post-conviction
relief.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Petitioners/Appellants believe oral argument would assist in
the decision process and therefore request oral argument under Rule
29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this 27th day of April, 1995.
COLLARD, APPEL & WARLAUMONT

^ameslT. Warlaumont
Attorney for Petitioners
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